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CASENOTES
GWALTNEY OF SMITHFIELD V. CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION,
INC.: THE PRECLUSION OF ACTIONS TO REDRESS WHOLLY PAST
VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
RECENTLY, the United States Supreme Court rendered an
opinion which may lay to rest a steadily growing controversy as
to the application of section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act.1 In
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,2 the
Supreme Court held that section 505(a) does not permit citizen
suits for wholly past violations.3 Although this decision may ini-
tially appear to inhibit the enforcement mechanisms of the stat-
ute, the Court, in effect, expanded its subject matter jurisdiction,
so that the decision actually enhances the impact of the citizen
suit provision."
In order to fully understand the impact of the decision ren-
1. In its entirety, section 505(a) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1986)) provides as
follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a
civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an efflu-
ent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Ad-
ministrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or (2)
against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator
to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an efflu-
ent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to
perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil
penalties under section 1319(d) of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1986), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. 1988).
2. 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
3. Id. at 381.
4. Id. at 386. (The jurisdictional issues discussed in this Note are strictly limited to
the congressional grant under the Clean Water Act.).
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dered in Gwaltney, a basic understanding of the Clean Water
Act's enforcement mechanisms is essential. The Clean Water Act
was enacted in 1972 for the purpose of restoring and maintaining
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of United States'
waters.5 As a means of achieving this goal, Congress installed a
permit program, known as The National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES), which allows companies to pollute
if they stay within the specific constraints set forth in their indi-
vidualized permits.' To aid in the monitoring of permit holders,
the Act allows states to establish and administer their own permit
programs, provided that they conform to federal guidelines.'
If a state or federal official discovers a permit violation, the
polluter may be subject to administrative, criminal, and civil pen-
alties." The Act provides a separate section for citizen suits which
allows "any citizen" to "commence" a civil action against: (1) the
plan's administrator for failure to properly perform his duties, and
(2) "any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation" of a state
or federal effluent standard.9
Pursuant to these statutory provisions, the State of Virginia
established a NPDES program. In 1974, the State of Virginia
Water Control Board issued a permit to the previous owners of
Gwaltney's meat packing plant, permitting them to discharge
seven regulated pollutants into the nearby Pagan River."
Gwaltney of Smithfield (Gwaltney) assumed ownership of the
plant in 1981 and utilized the plant to pack and process pork
products.11 Shortly thereafter, Gwaltney's plant began to register
violations on its discharge monitoring reports.12 These violations
were consistently reported until mid-1984,'1 with the last reported
violation occurring on May 15, 1984.14
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1986).
6. Id. § 1342.
7. Id. § 1342(b).
8. Id. § 1319.
9. Id. § 1365(a).
10. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 379
(1987).
11. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp.
1542, 1544 (E.D. Va. 1985).
12. Id. at 1545.
13. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 379 ("The most substantial of the violations concerned
the pollutants fecal coliform, chlorine, and total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN). Between Octo-
ber 27, 1981, and August 30, 1984, petitioner violated its TKN limitation 87 times, its
chlorine limitation 34 times, and its fecal coliform limitation 31 times.").
14. Id.
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In response to these ignored violations, the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation and the National Defense Council sent notices to both
the federal and state administrative agencies, indicating their in-
tent to commence suit. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation (CBF) is
a nonprofit, public interest environmental group with nearly
twenty thousand members living in the Chesapeake Bay area.' 5
Similarly, the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is a
national environmental group with over eight hundred members
living in the State of Virginia.16 Although this case was adminis-
tratively initiated in February of 1984, the plaintiffs did not file
their suit until June of 1984, approximately one month after
Gwaltney's last recorded violation.17 In their complaint, the plain-
tiffs allege that Gwaltney "has violated. . . [and] will continue to
violate its NPDES permit," and asked the federal District Court
of the Eastern Division of Virginia to provide declaratory and in-
junctive relief, impose civil penalties, and award attorney's fees
and costs. 8
The district court granted a partial summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and held that Gwaltney had violated or was
in violation of the Clean Water Act. A trial then proceeded on the
remedy issue. Before the district court had an opportunity to
render a decision, however, Gwaltney moved to dismiss based on
the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9 The district court
concluded that subject matter jurisdiction did exist, and that deci-
sion was eventually upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.2 0
I. HISTORY
Prior to the decision rendered by the United States Supreme
Court in Gwaltney, the appellate courts had arguably developed
four different approaches in an effort to determine whether section
505(a) of the Clean Water Act confers jurisdiction on citizen suits
for wholly past violations. The following is a brief summary of
those approaches.
15. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1544.
16. Id.
17. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 380.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th
Cir. 1986).
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A. Fifth Circuit Approach
The first approach was set forth by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.21 In
Hamker, the defendant's pipeline leaked, causing oil to flow down
a nearby river, damaging the plaintiffs' property. After approxi-
mately two weeks, the leak was discovered and plugged. Although
the violation had been discontinued, the plaintiffs filed a citizen's
suit pursuant to section 505(a) of the Act. In affirming the district
court's dismissal, the fifth circuit concluded that a complaint
brought under section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act "must al-
lege a violation occurring at the time the complaint is filed," and
that "citizens are limited to bringing actions only to remedy an
ongoing violation."22 In light of the circumstances presented by
that case, the disadvantages of this strict construction are obvious.
B. First Circuit Approach
An alternate approach was set forth by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp.,23 in which various marina owners brought suit pursuant to
section 505(a) in response to the defendant's up-stream effluent
permit violations, even though the violations had been discontin-
ued. The court concluded "that an action under 33 U.S.C. § 1365
may go forward if the citizen-plaintiff fairly alleges a continuing
likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, will again proceed
to violate the Act."' 24 The court affirmed the district court's dis-
missal, however, due to the fact that since the defendant had
ceased operations under its permit, subsequent violations were
more than likely not to continue.2 5
C. Fourth Circuit Approach
A third approach was developed by the fourth circuit through
its adjudication of the Gwaltney case.26 In refusing to dismiss the
plaintiff's suit, the court of appeals held that subject matter juris-
diction existed based on the court's conclusion that section 505
21. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
22. Id. at 395.
23. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986).
24. Id. at 1094.
25. Id.
26. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 304.
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"can be read to comprehend unlawful conduct that occurred only
prior to the filing of a lawsuit as well as unlawful conduct that
continues into the present."2 This opinion was supported by some
rather persuasive commentary from the statute's enacting
Congress.2"
D. Good Faith Allegation Approach
Arguably, a fourth approach was articulated as an alternative
in the decisions rendered by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the federal District Court of the Eastern Division of Virginia
in their Gwaltney opinions. In footnotes, both courts essentially
stated that subject matter jurisdiction may be established in a citi-
zen suit under the Clean Water Act if the plaintiff alleges in good
faith that the defendant was continuing to violate its permit at the
time the suit was filed.2"
Consequently, the Supreme Court was confronted with a se-
ries of inconsistent lower court decisions. Gwaltney presented the
Court with a perfect opportunity to dispel the confusion by setting
forth a clear definitive statement of the law.
II. GWALTNEY OF SMITHFIELD V. CHESAPEAKE BAY
FOUNDATION, INC.
A. Opinion of the Court
As stated earlier, the Gwaltney case presented the issue of
whether section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act confers federal
jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations.30 In at-
tempting to resolve the lower court inconsistencies, the Court set
forth an opinion which may raise questions as to the statute's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
1. Statutory Construction
After carefully examining the language, structure and legisla-
tive history of section 505 of the Act, the Court found that citi-
zens "may seek civil penalties only in a suit brought to enjoin or
otherwise abate an ongoing violation."31 Although the Court ac-
27. Id. at 309.
28. Id. at 311-12.
29. Id. at 308 n.9; Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1549 n.8.
30. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381.
31. Id. at 382.
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knowledged that the language of section 505 is ambiguous, the
Court argued that had Congress intended the statute to apply to
wholly past violations, it would have used language such as "to
have violated," and not "to be in violation. '3 2 The Court rejected
CBF's argument that the ambiguity was the result of a careless
legislative accident.3
The Court also considered the statute's structure in support-
ing its conclusion. The majority argued that the statute precludes
actions for past violations because its phrasing is almost entirely
in the present tense. Specifically, the Court pointed to the Act's
definition of the term "citizen," which includes only those "having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected. '34
Additionally, the Court observed that the Clean Water Act
requires citizens to notify violators of their intent to file suit sixty
days before commencing an action. 5 Because the only purpose of
the notice provision is to give violators an opportunity to comply
with the Act8 and escape the imposition of sanctions, allowing
citizens to bring actions for past violations would undermine the
function of the notice provision and frustrate administrative
discretion.
Finally, the Court's review of the Act's legislative history re-
vealed that most of the enacting Congress intended the citizen suit
mechanism to be essentially considered as an "abatement."37 For
the most part, the arguments set forth above were highly persua-
sive and consequently escaped criticism.
2. Jurisdictional Issues
However, this case was not concluded upon the resolution of
the statutory interpretation issues. The Court went on to address
the scope of the statute's jurisdictional grant and held that section
505(a) of the Clean Water Act confers jurisdiction over citizen
suits when the "citizen-plaintiffs make a good-faith allegation of a
continuous or intermittent violation." 8 Consequently, the Court
remanded the case to the court of appeals for further
32. Id. at 381.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 382 (emphasis added)(construing Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1365(g) (1986)).
35. Id. (construing Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1986)).
36. Id. at 382.
37. Id. at 383.
38. Id.
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consideration.a9
The Court reached its conclusion by examining the statute's
plain language which merely requires that the defendant be "al-
leged to be in violation" and not be "in violation" of the Act.4
The Court again rejected the argument that Congress had been
sloppy in its drafting of the Act, and concluded that requiring a
mere allegation of a violation indicates Congress' recognition of
the technological difficulties of detecting chronic environmental vi-
olators.4 1 The Court further noted that Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure4 2 which imposes sanctions for the filing
of frivolous claims, would prevent federal courts from being in-
nundated with baseless claims of violation of the Clean Water
Act.4
3
Gwaltney argued that such a holding would be contrary to
traditional notions of standing and allow parties to maintain suits
which have been mooted subsequent to filing. In addition,
Gwaltney argued that allowing a suit based on mere allegations
would grant jurisdiction to parties that have not actually been in-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 382 (construing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(ii) (1986)).
41. Id.
42. Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attor-
ney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, plead-
ings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the
averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abol-
ished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If
a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. B. Civ. P. 11.
43. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 385.
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
jured.1" The Court countered this argument by asserting that "a
suit will not be dismissed for lack of standing if there are suffi-
cient 'allegations of fact' - not proof - in the complaint or sup-
porting affidavits."" 5 The Court noted that if the allegations of
standing were not true, then the defendant could contest them
through a motion for summary judgment, at which point the bur-
den would shift to the plaintiff to offer evidence to support his
allegations."
With respect to the mootness issue, Gwaltney argued that al-
lowing allegations of an ongoing violation would permit citizens to
maintain suits after the violator has taken correctional measures
and achieved a state of compliance.47 Again, the Court refused to
accept Gwaltney's argument and held that a defendant may be
dismissed if he is able to demonstrate that it is "absolutely clear
that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be ei-
pected to recur. '48
In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to United
States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 9 which arose out
of various allegations of antitrust law violations. The defendants
in that case argued that conditions had since changed, making it
uneconomical to continue their unlawful course of dealing. In an
opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Court refused to accept
this defense and held that simply because an unforeseen develop-
ment renders a particular practice uneconomical, does not make it
absolutely clear that the wrongful behavior would not be likely to
reoccur.
50
The Gwaltney Court further noted that the mootness doctrine
protects plaintiffs "from defendants who seek to evade sanction by
44. Id.
45. Id. (The Court stated that this assertion is supported by the decision in Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), wherein various individuals and building companies filed suit
against the City of Penfield claiming that its zoning ordinance excluded persons of low and
middle income from living within the city. The Warth court concluded that the parties did
not have standing. Interestingly, Justice Marshall, who wrote the Gwaltney opinion, dis-
sented in Warth. Not surprisingly, the Warth dissent argued against deciding jurisdictional
issues based upon predictions as to the outcome of the case on its merits.).
46. Id. at 386.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (considering United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393
U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
50. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968).
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predictable 'protestations of repentance and reform.' "51 This rea-
soning was enunciated in United States v. Oregon State Medical
Soc'y,512 which also involved allegations of antitrust violations.
That case, however, only considered the factual issue of whether a
conspiracy among the medical profession actually existed.53
B. The Concurring Opinion in Gwaltney
For the most part, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion,
accepted the majority's view of the substantive interpretation of
the Clean Water Act." However, Scalia sharply criticized the
majority for creating what he believed to be a new form of subject
matter jurisdiction. Scalia believed that the majority opinion was
a radical and inappropriate departure from traditional jurisdic-
tiorial notions. 55
Scalia interpreted the statute to allow citizens to commence
actions based on allegations. Proof in support of the facts alleged,
he argued, could never be required at the commencement stage.
Rather, the allegations must be proven if the facts are challenged.
Scalia observed that it is "well ingrained in the law that subject
matter jurisdiction can be called into question either by challeng-
ing the sufficiency of the allegation or by challenging the accuracy
of the jurisdictional facts alleged."58
To support his position, Scalia cited several cases which ad-
dress the issue of whether the plaintiff's case in controversy ex-
ceeded the requisite dollar amount. In the cited cases, the Court
held that the plaintiff bears the burden of supporting the accuracy
of the jurisdictional facts alleged if disputed by the defendant. 57
The holding in these cases is clearly more traditional and conse-
quently, more acceptable.
As an alternative, the concurring opinion proposed that a vio-
51. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
52. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
53. Id. at 333.
54. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386-87.
55. See id. at 387.
56. Id.
57. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942)(dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for
railroad seniority rights because the matter in controversy exceeded the requisite dollar
amount); KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936)(plaintiff's attempt to en-
join defendant for disseminating news gathered by plaintiff dismissed for lack of dollar
amount); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936)(dismissing
the plaintiff's complaint for want of jurisdiction as the claim failed to support the requisite
dollar amount).
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lator should be considered to remain in violation of the Act until it
has "put in place remedial measures that clearly eliminate the
cause of the violation."58 Based on this view, the issue on remand
would be whether Gwaltney "had taken remedial steps that had
clearly achieved the effect of curing all past violations by the time
suit was brought. 59 Scalia believed that this was the preferable
approach because it did not require the creation of a novel form of
subject matter jurisdiction and also lightened the plaintiff's
burden.
III. ANALYSIS
In Gwaltney, the United States Supreme Court resolved a
steadily brewing controversy as to the applicability of section
505(a) of the Clean Water Act to citizen suits for wholly past
violations. By concluding that a citizen suit may only be brought
to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing violation, the Court has
created uniformity amongst the lower courts and a heightened de-
gree of certainty amongst the litigants. Although that choice ap-
pears to limit the Clean Water Act's citizen enforcement mecha-
nism, the Court enhanced that tool by allowing actions to lie
based on mere good faith allegations of violation.
The majority's approach to the statute's jurisdictional ques-
tion is somewhat radical and was not intended to apply to non-
environmental disputes. The concurring opinion sets forth a more
stable and consequently more preferable approach. Through
broadening the definition of the phrase "to be in violation,"
Scalia's approach renders plaintiffs better equipped to withstand
jurisdictional attack, without disturbing the traditional approaches
to statutory grants of federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the major-
ity opinion allows a plaintiff to bring claims that may not satisfy
the case or controversy requirements of article III of the Constitu-
tion. However, such conflicts are beyond the scope of this Note.
Nonetheless, the approaches set forth in the majority and
concurring opinions advance the goals of the Clean Water Act.
Justice Marshall and Justice Scalia were cognizant of the particu-
lar difficulties associated with the detection of pollution control vi-
olators and the resulting difficulty in documenting the evidence
necessary to avoid a dismissal. Through the opinions, the Court
58. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 387.
59. Id. at 388.
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has manifested a willingness to relax the prerequisites necessary to
obtain jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act and has aided in
the effectuation of the Clean Water Act's purpose.
RICHARD A. Di Lisi

